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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes news media’s role in governmental decision-making
processes related to a gradually intensifying series of earthquakes result-
ing from gas drilling in the Netherlands, and catastrophic natural earth-
quakes in Italy. According to the risk governance actors interviewed in
both cases, media play three roles, as: democratic fora, agenda setters,
and strategic instruments. Media attention for risk can create ripple
effects in governmental decision-making processes. However, media
attention tends to be risk-event driven and focuses on direct news-
worthy consequences of events. For ‘non-event risks’, or when news-
worthiness after a risk-event fades, the media’s agenda setting and
democratic fora roles are limited. This contributes to risk attenuation in
society, potentially resulting in limited risk prevention and preparedness.
Governmental actors report difficulties in using news media for strategic
communication to facilitate risk governance because of media’s ten-
dency towards sensationalism. Our research suggests that, in the gov-
ernance of earthquake-risk news, media logic overrules other
institutional logics only for a short while and not in the long run when
the three roles of media do not reinforce each other.
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News media such as newspapers, television radio and online sources play an important role in risk
governance processes because they provide society with risk information about the causes and
effects of risk events. Many risk researchers have studied the role of media in the social construction
of risk (e.g. Gamson and Modigliani 1989). In addition, scholars have focused on media’s prominent
role in shaping public risk concerns, perceptions, and attitudes, and amplifying or attenuating risk
signals by selecting and framing messages (e.g. Kasperson et al. 1988; L€ofstedt and Renn 1997;
Bakir 2010). Less attention has been paid to media’s role in risk governance processes conducted by
civil servants and public bureaucracies in multi-stakeholder networks, although media in demo-
cratic countries usually report on public actors’ positions and actions in governance processes, often
publicly questioning them (Hood 2010). When media report the responses and repercussions in the
aftermath of a risk event, they emphasize certain aspects of risks and often focus on governance
actors’ responsibilities and not on factual information about the risk (Renn 2008). As Howarth
CONTACT Alette Eva Opperhuizen opperhuizen@essb.eur.nl School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Erasmus
University, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 Rotterdam, Netherlands.
 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
JOURNAL OF RISK RESEARCH
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1750458
(2013) states, capturing the dynamics between political and media actors is ‘the weakest link’ in
research about the social amplification of risk. In this paper, the term ‘media’ refers to news media
which include print media (newspapers and magazines), broadcast news (radio and television) and
digital media (online, blogs, twitter, etc.).
The research question of this study is: What is the news media’s role in the risk governance
decision-making process regarding earthquake risks? In the current study, The Social Amplification
of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988) serves as a backbone for further investigation
of roles that news media play in risk amplification processes in society and influence risk govern-
ance of recurring earthquakes. We will build on the three roles (democratic fora, agenda setters,
and strategic instruments) for media in relation to governance processes identified by Korthagen
(2015). Empirically, the study draws on two cases: 1.) a gradually emerging earthquake risk
induced by human activities (gas drilling) in the Netherlands, 2.) tectonic movement of the
underground in Italy caused strong, recurring disruptive earthquakes in the Italian Norcia region.
Theoretical framework
Risk governance and the social amplification of risk
Risk issues are often governed through interactive and complex decision-making processes (Renn
2008). According to Klinke and Renn (2019, p. 2), risk governance ‘marks out institutional struc-
tures and socio-political processes that guide and restrain collective activities … ‘aiming to prevent
and reduce negative impacts. Risk, by definition, is not only about objectivity but also about sub-
jectivity. For example, public risk perception and acceptance of earthquake risks were shown to
be more negative for human-induced earthquakes than for natural earthquakes (McComas et al.
2016). Risk governance networks therefore have to deal with perceived risk, and responses by
actors in society that may deviate from expert risk assessments (Wardman and L€ofstedt 2018).
The social amplification risk framework (SARF) provides a broad conceptual framework for
understanding the dynamic character of societal risk responses (Kasperson et al. 1988). Risk amp-
lification entails both processes which intensify and weaken risk attitudes and responses in soci-
ety (Kasperson et al. 1988; Rip 1988; Fjaeran and Aven 2019). In the first stage of SARF, risk
events, situations, or objects may emerge and obtain signal value, meaning that an issue
becomes more or less perceived and attributed as a risk for society. A flow of messages can arise
and images may spread in media, whereby risk as a social construct accrues further salience and
significance. This can stimulate concerns in the public sphere and in the economic or political
arena, and can affect institutional processes and structures in the governance network. These rip-
ple effects go beyond the direct harm of the risk event and include e.g. political debates, govern-
mental decisions, and changing economic activities (Kasperson et al. 1988). This also entails
responses and repercussions about failures to prepare for events predicted by scientific risk
assessors (Poumadere et al. 2005). Burns et al. (1993) argue that public responses in various cases
appear to be determined by perceptions that risk are caused by managerial incompetence.
Signals of substantial risks for society are not always intensified. They can also be weakened,
a process called attenuation. Attenuation can lead to ‘doing-nothing’ in risk governance (Fjaeran
and Aven 2019).
Three news media roles in risk governance processes
News media play an important role in the deliberation and social construction of risk, and there-
fore influence citizens’ risk perception and concerns (Renn 2008; Walker et al. 2010; Bakir 2010).
Korthagen (2015) identified three roles for media in governance processes which are distin-
guished analytically, but interact and may reinforce one another in practice. These are media as
democratic fora, agenda setters, and instruments for strategic communication.
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Media as democratic fora
Media provide a platform for informing citizens (Bakir 2010), disclosing information about a risk
event when personal experience is lacking (McCombs 2004), and enabling public discussion
(Schudson 2008). Media’s watchdog function enables citizens to monitor governmental perform-
ance (Aalberg and Curran 2012) and hold government accountable for their risk governance
(Iyengar and Simon 1993). Critical media can be beneficial, when their attention helps govern-
ance networks to function better (Norris 2014).
Media as agenda setters
Risk issues that attract a lot of attention become a prominent concern for society (McCombs
2004), and this focus influences public opinion (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). By selecting and
framing issues that are relevant (for stakeholders) in society, media have an agenda-building
role. Media thus can put risk issues on decision makers’ agendas (Elder and Cobb 1983;
Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2011).
Media as instruments for strategic communication
News media have a large reach in society and can be used by actors within stakeholders to com-
municate their messages. Kepplinger (2007) showed that media reports influence actors’ aware-
ness, cognitions and emotions. Media can also be used to stimulate or discourage individual and
group risk behavior (Kasperson et al. 1988; Bakir 2010).
Media logic, mediatization and risk governance
In all three roles, news media operate through a specific media logic, translating and transform-
ing information in specific ways. Media logic implies that reporting tends to focus on negative
news, human interest stories, and drama (sensation) (Bennett 2009), thus shaping risk informa-
tion. Opperhuizen, Schouten, and Klijn (2019a) showed that media logic shapes Dutch news
media reports on gas-drilling induced earthquakes. Kepplinger (2007) and Vasterman (2018)
argued that news media may become very influential in the social construction of risk, particu-
larly when an issue causes a media hype. Kepplinger (2007) argued that media logic may cause
journalists to become part of the risk issue themselves and create reality on their own. The lead-
ing perceptions shaped by media, including realities created by journalists, are not without con-
sequences and influence decision-making processes directly (Wardman and L€ofstedt 2018).
Scholars even speak of the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Str€omb€ack and
Esser 2009; Hjarvard 2013).
Thus ripple effects generated by media reports can influence risk governance processes (Renn
2008). Versluis et al. (2010) state that attenuation of risk in society may lead to the neglect of
risk governance preparedness in the long run. Poumadere and Mays (2003) describe that after
the risk perception about heat waves changed and initiated the social amplification of the risk,
risk governance measures were rapidly taken. However, as time went on media attention faded
and planned risk preparedness activities were cancelled. Fjaeran and Aven (2019) argue that for
‘non-event-risks’ the modus operandi is often societal and managerial ‘non-response’. In addition,
risk managers can play a substantial role in the attenuation of risk by not responding to risk sig-
nals from experts (Poumadere et al. 2005). Although mediatized amplification and attenuation of
risk have important consequences for risk governance networks, this issue has not yet been sys-
tematically studied in the light of SARF.
SARF has been criticized for its lack of precision and theoretical foundation, particularly
regarding the creation of ripple effects, or the lack of it (Rip 1988). According to Rip (1988) it is
unclear ‘what’ creates the ripples; is it only the event itself such as an earthquake, or also the
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perception of the risk? Rayner, et al. (1988) also criticizes SARF, arguing that societal risks can
also be mentally constructed without events. Busby and Onggo (2013) mention that subjectivity
is critical for the impact risk signals have on society. In the study at hand both the risk (particu-
larly the adverse consequences of events) and the risk signals (influencing perceptions and
responses) can be amplified or attenuated, for instance after reframing or novel interpretation of
available information. News media play an important role either by initiating social amplification
processes, or by amplifying ripples previously created by risk events or perceived hazards. .
Methodology
Case selection
This research involves a double, international case study of earthquake risks in the Netherlands
and Italy, but we do not investigate national differences between Italy and the Netherlands.
The earthquake risk in the Netherlands exemplifies a gradually evolving, human-induced
environmental risk. Prior to the gas extraction started in 1963, the area was aseismic, but deca-
des of gas extraction from the early 1990s onwards resulted in a slight but gradually increasing
frequency of earthquakes with higher magnitudes (Vlek 2018). Until 2012 however, the earth-
quakes were not a strongly debated risk issue in the news media (Opperhuizen, Schouten, and
Klijn 2019a). This changed when an earthquake (M¼ 3.6) struck the region that caused much
more damage to houses than previously experienced. Earthquake risk then became a prominent
issue in the news media and on the policy agenda(Opperhuizen, Klijn, and Schouten 2019b). This
Dutch case was selected because (a) it exemplifies the risk of earthquakes as a direct conse-
quence of human action, (b) the earthquake risk arises more from the high frequency and less
from the (disruptive) magnitude of particular earthquakes, and c) news media played an import-
ant role in raising social and political awareness of the risk (Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015).
The second case is located in an Italian region with a long history of seismically activity. In
2016, strong earthquakes hit the Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzo, and Marche regions (average M¼ 6.2);
and in 2017 another series of earthquakes (average M¼ 5.3) occurred. The media reported elab-
orately on the earthquakes but were accused of misleading the public with incomplete, propa-
gandistic, and contradictory information, causing fatal consequences (Bock 2017). The broad
media coverage also negatively influenced an important economic sector: tourism. This Italian
case was selected for three main reasons: (a) it exemplifies natural earthquake risks and thus
contrasts with the Dutch human-induced earthquake risks, (b) the earthquake risk arises more
from the disruptive magnitude and less from the frequency of earthquakes, and c) news media
played a substantive role in raising risk awareness.
Interviews
Thirty-three semi-structured interviews were conducted (18 in the Netherlands and 15 in Italy) with
representatives of the most important national and local actors involved in the risk governance net-
work at various government levels, multiple local citizen groups, and experts. Appendix A provides
an overview of the organizations involved. The respondent sample reflects the various interests
that stakeholders in the governance network have regarding risk governance and media coverage,
thus preventing a one-sided view of the cases. There were no interviews with journalists however,
or other actors outside the (broadly demarcated) governance network. Thus, this paper analyses
the role of the media on the basis of sources external to the media themselves.
The semi-structured interviews were tailored to each interviewee’s role in the risk governance
process. Confidentiality was guaranteed to encourage respondents to discuss sensitive topics. A
codebook based on the theoretical roles of news media in governance processes was used for
the coding process (see Table 1).
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Empirical results
Democratic fora in the Dutch case
In the Dutch case, the respondents agreed that, in general, the media serve as democratic fora,
acknowledging that citizens’ voices are represented. Local groups, however, were critical of how
the media chose their stories and images. Others argued that their voices were less heard than
other citizens’ voices, and that different sides of the story were not sufficiently reflected. Hence,
they also reflected critically on the democratic fora role played by the media. Actors tried to
share facts and explanations with the media, but these were often ignored; in their view, media
prefer sensational news. According to several interviewees, some (especially local) media tended
to focus on citizens’ feelings, adopting an activist attitude in messages:
… by all means, the tone of media shows what society thinks, expects, and wants to hear in this area.
It is difficult for actors to publicly discuss risk issues with citizens via the media. Interviewees
find it hard to enter the public debate because it is so complex. Consequently, they feel unheard
by the governance network and are dissatisfied. Participation in democratic fora is tough for
some actors because:
… It is operating in a minefield, with very complicated matters to explain simply.
According to a majority of respondents, the media should be more critical and more inform-
ative because that is essential for the proper functioning of society. In their view, media focus
strongly on heat-of-the-moment issues instead of on proper research journalism. Respondents
report a situation whereby risk issues regarding earthquakes seem to be not newsworthy
enough. The lack of newsworthiness is seen as dangerous, because the media’s control function
is important for society as well as for the risk governance network.
… they look over your shoulder, and we have to explain or disprove questions correctly.
Democratic fora in the Italian case
In the Italian case also, the media as democratic fora are both acknowledged and criticized by
respondents. The media function well by quickly informing relevant parties about public ques-
tions, needs, and issues voiced by citizens.
Table 1. Codes for analyzing media roles.
Concept Codes for media role
Democratic fora Actors publicly discuss risk issues in media and obtain their democratic information
from media
Citizens’ ability to ‘check’ risk governance processes and their performance through media
Misbehavior or unfavorable decisions are translated into media attention. The media
function as watchdog
Critical media attention helps the governance network to function better
Agenda setter Media put risk issues on the decision makers’ agenda. Media select and frame risk issues
that are relevant (for groups) in society
The way media select and frame a risk issue influences perception and acceptance of
the risk
Risk issues that attract a lot of attention become a prominent concern for society
A shift in media attention (amount and content) can disrupt the decision-making process
Strategic instrument Media are used to transmit risk information between the risk governance network and
others in society
Actors within the risk governance network use media as transmitting station for
information
Media messages impact decisions
Media messages are used as instruments to influence individual risk behavior
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…we [local citizens] knew what the problems were and they [the media] were able to bring them to the
attention of relevant people.
Respondents generally see the dialogue between citizens and the media as beneficial for gen-
eral discussions, sometimes leading to improvements in the decision-making process. Media
attention also helps to improve actors’ own decisions and actions. Because an earthquake is not
an ordinary situation and various solutions must be found for a complex set of problems caused
by the hazardous event, a good evaluation by the media helps to improve decision making and
detect possible flaws according to interviewees.
Some actors mentioned that media help to keep a check on the risk governance process, ena-
bling citizens to monitor policy decisions:
… Moreover, the press is also an instrument to draw attention to the area, so that the administration acts in
the public interest without unjustified delays. What matters is being precise, pinpointing responsibilities, and
asking those in charge to make better interventions.
However, respondents formulated two main critiques; i) media do not persist in reporting in
the long run, as directly after an earthquake, there is plenty of media attention because of the
dramatic nature of the event, but then the media fail to follow up on successive developments.
ii) media show unrealistic images and stories, regularly quoting people with bizarre opinions.
Multiple respondents argued that the incorrect information, self-managed reality, provided by
media does more harm than good to citizens, because the media often adopt a sentimental
approach with superficial analysis of the problem definition. Consequently, the ‘real problem is
overlooked’. The negative and complex spread of information makes it more difficult to improve
risk governance decisions. A respondent from a citizens’ organization said:
… Being destructive is very easy, whereas being constructive is very difficult. There are many problems, I am
not denying it, but you also have to look for other stories, be proactive… what was missing was
investigative journalism.
It was argued that the incorrect information and sensational messages provided by the media
is harmful for the authorities and also negatively affects communities.
Agenda setting in the Dutch case
The media’s role as agenda setter is acknowledged, but the respondents agreed that, in the ear-
lier years of the earthquakes, media did not fulfil this role. For a long time, media did not take
the risk of earthquakes seriously.
… In Groningen, there was a silent disaster.
According to several respondents, the enormous economic revenues from gas made it difficult
to put the risks on the agenda. Local interest organizations tried to ‘keep the fire heated’ by writ-
ing about certain aspects of the risk issue, but it was hard to get these messages across in the
media, respondents stated. Agenda setting is only possible by highlighting stories that influence
people’s risk perceptions:
… .it gives the feeling a disaster is increasing when everyone talks about it.
Respondents’ opinions differ about media’s influence on risk perception and acceptance.
Some argued that media attention is positive because it puts social issues on the governance
agenda. Others believed that the media do not create real awareness at societal level, because
the distance between the risk and their audience remains large:
…Apparently, you have to experience it yourself to know what this risk is really about, so it is still a regional
problem and not a national problem.
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Only a negative and sensational story may break this frame according to some interviewees:
‘this risk issue is not mediagenic enough’. This limits the media role as agenda setter for the
national policy agenda according to respondents.
Actors indicated that, when the media put the spotlight on earthquakes in 2013, the topics
also appeared on the political agenda. It ‘is a chicken and egg story’, and it remains unclear
whether media attention or political debate came first, but they definitely reinforced each other.
Media’s focus on a certain issue indicates a socially sensitive issue, and politicians can hardly
neglect it.
…media ask questions about the decision-making process… , When there is no media attention, a decision
maker will analyze the situation quietly, but when the media address the issue, everybody directly wants to see
a policy response.
Increased media attention leads to simplistic calls for action, a respondent argued. Actors
noted that the economic interest in gas supply was suddenly replaced on the governance net-
work’s agenda by the need for action. Multiple respondents find that politicians are sensitive to
hypes, and one respondent underlined that this may even be dangerous: ‘it has all become short-
sighted, this is a pity or it is even a dangerous development’. Some respondents indicate that too
much media attention leads to overreactions, with negative results when they are not in line
with carefully defined priorities:
… It is a toxic mixture of politics and media that creates a certain pressure that is so big that it is almost
impossible to cope with.
All respondents agreed that the media affect the political agenda directly, but they doubted
the impact in the long run.
Agenda setting in the Italian case
Actors note that the way in which media informed and framed information played a crucial role
in the Italian governance network during the emergency phase. However, media reporting was
confusing also. It informed actors about the severity of the situation, and underlined that the
emergency required serious attention.
… . This showed that media only come after the first phases of an emergency, and it’s difficult to rely on news.
Governance network actors agreed that, after the emergency phase, the media had an
agenda setting role, showing major concern towards society and influencing the activities of sev-
eral actors within the network. ‘The political agenda was directly affected, which unfortunately did
not translate into many immediate and concrete actions.’ Actors saw media as a necessary institu-
tion for regional visibility, indicating that many representatives of Italian institutions visited the
area during the emergency phase. However, this visibility was temporary, ‘if they stop talking
about it, the State may lose interest in solving the current problems, which have become even
worse’. Media and political attention decreased while citizens continued to face difficulties. The
falloff in attention was unfortunate, because many more things remained to be done, and many
people still faced difficulties years later.
Additionally, according to the interviewees, media reports were sensational as sometimes
they gave the idea that the entire province was permanently subject to earthquake shocks. The
number of reports and the framing repulsed citizens and tourists according to interviewees,
which hindered economic recovery.
Respondents indicated various expectations of the media as agenda setters. First, they indi-
cated that there should be more sensitivity and precision in media reports, to avoid indirect
damage. Second, a more positive image of the region should be projected. In addition, several
interviewees said that the media do not highlight the positive attributes of the region. Positive
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news would create more trust in the region, e.g. more jobs would be created. Another respond-
ent adopted a positive tone regarding media as agenda setters:
…we wouldn’t be able to solve the issue without the help of newspapers or television. We really were able to
speak at national level about what was a major problem for us at that moment. Media sometimes are
necessary to raise awareness about critical issues of the earthquake.
Strategic instrument in the Dutch case
Respondents reported that they try to use the media as strategic instruments to tell their own
story to serve their own interest. However, the reasons for using the media as strategic instru-
ments differed between actors. National and local governments employed media to announce
decisions, arguing that they use the media to be transparent. At the same time, they acknow-
ledge the difficulty of communicating about decisions in an easy and understandable way.
Citizens’ groups and local authorities mainly employed the media to explain what citizens should
do in specific situations for example by providing information about the situation and communi-
cating action plans to stimulate individual risk reduction behavior. Besides the positive aspects
of transparency, there are also doubts about transparency and whether or not becomes the
main focus of the network, i.e. causing goal displacement.
The media also functioned as strategic instruments for actors who wanted to communicate
with the public, independent of other parties in the governance network. NAM, Safety Region,
and KNMI argued that their independent role is extremely important and therefore they wanted
independent communication messages. They were afraid that, if they sent a message jointly with
another actor in the network, trust in their independence would be affected.
… you have to be very clear about what you are doing to ensure that you are not equated with other actors
within the network. The way we communicate and intensify our communication we show people that we work
in a transparent way, and do not have a hidden agenda.
Other actors argued that the governance network should think collectively about when, how,
and by whom a message is spread, bearing in mind that everybody needs their ‘success’ and
‘you have to grant one another something’. In their view, the governance network needs to make
a plan and communicate strategically in a joint manner. Having one collective communication
strategy is challenging according to the respondents however, because it conflicts with network
actors’ individual aims and interests.
Multiple actors mentioned that they change their strategy regarding media use over time. For
example, the Ministry changed its strategy to show more commitment. This is a change from a
decide-announce-defend strategy to a more interactive strategy with two-way communication:
…We are a techno-scientific department, turned inwards. Used to taking a decision with a group of people
together with politicians and then executing the decision to make it known outside. It was new to talk about
decisions with the environment. In the beginning, the department found it first surprising that the rest of the
world did not understand what brilliant, well-balanced decisions were taken here.
The Ministry publicly communicated that there had been a governance failure, thus acknowl-
edging what citizen groups had long been arguing. However, showing commitment through the
media was not enough for local authorities and citizens’ groups. They argued that showing com-
mitment was nice, but they judged the Ministry on its actions in the decision-making process.
This illustrates how strategic media communication may not be sufficient to gain support, if it is
not backed up by concrete action. Some actors argue that long and consistent critical deliber-
ation in the media affects decision-making processes according to actors. To illustrate this, they
report that after severe criticism in the press, the gas industry (NAM) was removed from dam-
age-compensation claim procedures.
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Strategic instrument in the Italian case
In Italy, the media were used as strategic instruments for different reasons. First, media were
used by authorities to collect and streamline the diffuse information that emerged during the
catastrophic earthquakes and directly afterwards. This led to a fast exchange of information but
also a diffuse information flow. Second, media were strategically used to highlight the need for
resources (financial) in the area. However, in asking for donations, the authorities found it diffi-
cult to project a balanced picture in the media:
… We wanted to highlight that an earthquake had occurred and ask for help to show the most dramatic
moments and difficulties, where people were frightened, the people complained about this. So, if we ask for
help, reality must be shown as well.
Third, in the period after receiving donations and the reconstructing phase, the media were
used to communicate to the donors the measures taken by the municipality: ‘we were able to
show the whole world what we were doing’. Thus, media facilitated transparency in the decision-
making process. In this case also, the negative side effect of transparency was mentioned: trans-
parency can lead citizens to become critical of officialdom.
Further, media were strategically used to promote the region after the earthquakes to minim-
ize indirect effects, like the decrease in tourism. Many respondents mentioned that using (social)
media to show the damage caused by an earthquake created a negative impression of the
region. Therefore, they used media for promotion and became extremely aware of the content
used. For example, the word ‘safety’ was not mentioned because it emphasizes the disaster
instead of promoting the region.
Discussion
The results show that news media (print, broadcast and online) in The Netherlands and Italy play
roles as democratic fora, agenda setters, and strategic instruments in earthquake risk governance
processes although differences between the cases exist (see Tables 2–4).
The interviews show that, in both cases, media play an important role as democratic fora in
the earthquake risk governance process by representing citizens’ voices, thus enabling citizens to
raise certain risk issues. Media also transmit and amplify risk information and stories, for example
from a local to a national scope. This is consistent with previous research (McCombs 2004;
Schudson 2008). However, one major problem that Italian and Dutch interviewees report is that
media are little interested in factual information, as also reported by Gearhart, Adegbola, and
Huemmer (2019). Therefore, actors face difficulties entering the media and contributing to in-
depth democratic deliberations with factual risk information.
In the Italian case, media reports in the emergency phase influenced risk perceptions and
were used by actors within the network to determine the size of the disaster. The ‘brute reality
of the physical consequences’ (Busby and Duckett 2012, 1066) was the dominant media interpret-
ation of reality in the short run. Media served mainly as a source of information for citizens
about adverse social, economic and cultural consequences. The agenda setting role seems mar-
ginal in the long run, and media appears less a forum for societal debate about interests, prob-
ably because the disruptive impact of the earthquakes left little room for other foci.
Gas drilling in the Netherlands created a long series of mild trembles (mainly magnitudes less
than 3) which were often not noticed by citizens. The Dutch earthquake risk shows similarities
with what Fjaeran and Aven (2019) classify as ‘non-event risks’ because the risk can be referred
to as ‘risk and uncertainty source’ which results in no response of risk management in the polit-
ical arena as was observed for decades. In the absence of a major event, media did not create
ripple effects for long periods of time, risks are actually attenuated by the news media. Similar to
catastrophic event in the Italian case, the democratic fora role is limited as the newsworthiness
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of non-event risk is low. However, particularly after 2013, media attention focuses on earth-
quakes as an issue of social interest and conflicts. Actors strategically use media’s democratic
forum role to promote their own values and interests, and to explain and defend their opinions,
responsibilities, and interests. The conflicting interests create discussion and ambiguity about
possible mistakes and misbehavior, which are important for social amplification processes
according to Poumadere and Mays (2003).
Overall, the cases suggest that the watchdog function in its own right hardly affects risk man-
agement decisions in the long run. The role of media in earthquake preparedness preceding haz-
ardous events especially appears to be low, even when catastrophic events like the Italian
Table 3. Comparison earthquake events and media’s agenda setter role.
Agenda setter
Dutch case; gradually emerging
earthquake risk induced by
human activities
Italian case; disruptive earthquake risk
caused by natural processes
Manifestation:
 Media enhance policy attention
and influence the political agenda
for a short period
Manifestation:
 Information provided about
emergency phase, thus helping
determine policy priorities
 Local visibility generated for
problem and solutions stimulated
(e.g. financial support)
Limitations:
 No influence on agenda setting
before serious earthquake happen
 Agenda setting often results in
short political (over) reaction,
rarely in direct
management decisions
 Agenda setting leads to
simplification and short-sighted
views and stimulates goal
displacement
 Weak agenda setting effects at
national level; the issue remains a
local problem
Limitations
 Incorrect information by media
results in errors in national and
local governance actors’ agenda
 Limited effects in terms of
concrete reconstruction actions
 Visibility is used for politicians’
own goals, i.e. political promotion
 Agenda setting is prominent in
emergency phase
 Sensationalism and negative
images cause negative effects on
risk perception and regional
tourism economy
Table 2. Comparison earthquake risks and media’s democratic fora role.
Democratic fora
Dutch case; gradually emerging
earthquake risk induced by
human activities
Italian case; disruptive earthquake risk
caused by natural processes
Manifestations:
 Citizens’ voices are represented
 Critical reflection on decision
making facilitated after serious
risk event
 Local newspapers give space for
critical essays on risk governance
Manifestations:
 Citizens can check risk
governance process because
media place spotlight on
reconstruction process
 Reports by media facilitate actors’
own decision making and actions
Limitations:
 Dissatisfaction about media focus,
based on their own values
and logic
 Media logic often overrides
factual accounts, causing:
– Complexity of the policy issue,
making it hard for citizens to
enter the media agenda
– Distrust in network governance,
affecting public discussion
Limitations:
 Watchdog function and
transparency only directly after a
physical risk event and not in the
long term, with limited
opportunities for social
deliberation
 Sensational framing focuses on
citizens’ negative stories, leading
to unrealistic images and stories
with biased problem definitions
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earthquakes can be predicted and expected. This finding amends and specifies theory arguing
that media generally function as a watchdog (Iyengar and Simon 1993; Aalberg and
Curran 2012).
The limited role of media as democratic fora can be explained both by the complex nature of
earthquake risk governance and by the logic of contemporary media. Firstly, earthquake risk and
its governance are so complex that it is difficult for media to cover techno-scientific elements
and make the issue salient for citizens to enter the public discussion. This easily leads to over-
simplification by media and hampers social groups that try to counter unfavorable decisions or
wrongdoing. Secondly, media logic narrows the focus to newsworthy aspects of risk, thus ampli-
fying sensational, dramatic, and negative aspects and attenuating others (Altheide and Snow
1979; Binder et al. 2014). Particularly the sensation and drama focus of media, the negative fram-
ing of the societal consequences of earthquakes, and mediatization elements were generally dis-
liked and perceived as counterproductive by network actors. They complained that the media
are not seriously interested in facts, and develop a self-created reality. This is in line with previous
studies by Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995), and Vasterman (2018). The consequence is, accord-
ing to the network actors, that the power to improve decision making in the risk governance
network is undermined. The media’s framing and logic may cause the actual risk to be over-
looked, and generate negative ripple effects with adverse consequences for risk governance as
Rip already noted in 1988.
Regarding the agenda setting function, the findings indicate that media in both cases do set
the agenda in the short run, but not necessarily in the long run because media attention tends
to fade after some time. Consistent with our results, Kahlor et al. (2019) also shows that, in the
USA, media reporting about the risk of earthquakes related to gas and oil fracking was limited
and faded rapidly after events. According to the risk governance network actors in our cases, the
political arena was particularly sensitive to a media hype, as has also been reported by
Vasterman (2018). The short duration of media attention makes it possible for governance net-
work actors to ‘ignore’ the media attention after a short period, and return to business as usual,
Table 4. Comparison earthquake events and media’s strategic instrument role.
Strategic instrument
Dutch case; gradually emerging
earthquake risk induced by
human activities
Italian case; disruptive earthquake risk
caused by natural processes
Manifestation:
 Promotion of actors’ own values
and interests
 Used for transparency about
decision-making process
 Used to explain decisions to the
broader public
 Help in the simulation of
individual risk behavior
 Used to clarify actors’ roles




 Used for sharing knowledge
 Used for influencing
resource allocation
 Used for transparency about the
decision-making process
 Help in promoting the region
Limitations:
 Simple transmission of messages
is difficult
 Sensationalism is required to
attract media attention
 Goal displacement can occur as a
consequence of the call for more
transparency
 All the actors have their own




 Focus on negative stories makes
it hard to report positive and
nuanced stories
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without changing their risk governance processes. This is an example of ‘doing-nothing’ in risk
governance (Fjaeran and Aven 2019, Poumadere and Mays 2003). Also Versluis et al. (2010) state
that attenuation of risk in society may diminish risk preparedness, and that signals for the long
run may be neglected.
The multiplicity of opinions related to the democratic fora role, in combination with the lack
of interest in factual information, seriously hindered use of the media’s strategic role by network
actors. As various actors stated, they were not successful in developing coherent strategies to
use the media to support (collective) decision making and activities to deal with the risk events
– despite some network actors indicated that they individually changed their media strategy in
an attempt to make better use of media. In the Italian case, strategic use of media was success-
ful in drawing attention to the financial problems and generating support and donations for
recovery. However, the Italian media’s strategic role in the long term was limited, and the focus
on negative stories made it difficult for the risk governance network to expose the public to
positive stories about reconstruction and social resilience. This secondary ripple may have had
negative consequences for the reconstruction of the region, for instance through the negative
impact on tourism.
Theoretically, the democratic function and strategic roles of the media are not independent
from each other. For example, the strategic role can be used to influence public discussions.
Thus, both roles can provide a foundation for the agenda setting in the long run. Amplification
and prolongation of messages about the risk as social construct and managerial competence
may even affect processes and structures of institutions of the risk governance network. This
aligns with the notion that ripples reflect complex patterns of selective attenuation and amplifi-
cation (e.g. Kasperson et al. 1988). However, in our cases actors were not very successful in stra-
tegically using the media to influence the political agenda in the long run beyond clear
risk events.
Dutch media seemed to be interested mainly in social elements of the earthquake risk,
whereas the risk governance experts were more interested in the technical or factual elements.
This is consistent with existing literature showing that media often report on items relating to
people’s risk perception and attitudes, for example reports mention anger and blame, compas-
sion, heroism, and anxiety (Dunwoody and Neuwirth 1991). However, Dutch governance network
actors persisted in using the democratic forum role of media strategically. which ultimately
exerted pressure on the Dutch political agenda. This did not result in major policy changes in
the time period studied in this paper (2017–2018). But in 2019, the Dutch government changed
its gas drilling policies, and, although we did not study 2019, it cannot be ruled out that the pol-
icy changes were influenced by the increasing, critical media reports.
Conclusions
Overall, the two cases show that news media, in line with previous theories, served different
roles in the risk governance decision-making processes regarding specific earthquake risks: as
democratic fora, as agenda setters, and as strategic instruments for network actor communica-
tion. In both cases, media attention around earthquake risks was largely risk-event driven as this
is more newsworthy than non-event risks and focused on dramatic and direct consequences.
This underscores studies that contend that media logic is biased towards sensational stories and
events (Bennett 2009). According to our respondents, media logic limits the agenda-setting role
of media in risk governance processes and can have adverse consequences for risk governance
networks. Actors in the governance network tend to focus on techno-scientific information (and
thus low newsworthiness) which seriously hinders media’s roles as democratic fora and limits the
reporting about the risk by news media, thus reducing the agenda setting role.
12 A. E. OPPERHUIZEN ET AL.
Theoretical mechanism
The two cases show that media can play different roles in social amplification or attenuation of
risk. News media as democratic forum, can amplify risk as a social construct by disseminating
information and diverging opinions and creating more awareness, even in absence of increasing
(or new) physical risk events. With regards to the fundamental question in SARF about ‘what’ is
amplified? our study provides two answers. First, the awareness about a risk is amplified, as more
messages become available about the techno-scientific aspects of a risk, and particularly about
the perceived adverse consequences. The perception of consequences may differ between indi-
viduals, stakeholders and communities. It can lead to discussions and ambiguity as Poumadere
and Mays (2003) and Busby and Onggo (2013) argue, which may further shape the development
of perceptions of the risk as social construct. Second, interviewees in Italy report that due to
media attention the region was stigmatized, which adversely affected the region’s recovery.
These secondary adverse effects can at least to some extend be attributed to media, which thus
amplify the material damage.
On the basis of interviews with a wide variety of stakeholders in two risk governance net-
works our study suggests that decision making in earthquake risk governance networks shows
resilience against short-lived media influences. In the governance of earthquake risks, media logic
overrules other institutional logics only for a short while and not in the long run when media
only play a role as democratic forum. This conclusion nuances existing literature arguing that
media logic overrules other institutional logics (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Str€omb€ack and Esser
2009) and adds to SARF that media play different roles in the creation of ripples which reach the
political arena.
Limitation of the study and future research
A limitation of this study is that it focuses only on the governance of earthquake risks in two
cases. The empirical generalizability may be limited as risk dynamics are context dependent
(Wardman and L€ofstedt 2018). Second, the interviews were held in 2017 and 2018, while in the
Dutch case in 2019 the drilling volume was lowered dramatically with the aim of mitigating
future earthquakes. Future research could investigate whether the media influenced this deci-
sion. A third limitation is that this study is only based on interviews with the most important
stakeholders in risk governance networks. Media actors themselves and other parties were not
interviewed. Future research including interviews with journalists, will further add to the under-
standing of the media-risk governance interaction, the weakest link in research about the social
amplification of risk (Howarth 2013).
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Appendix A
Respondent Organization Dutch Case Respondent Organization Italian Case
1 Ministry Economic Affairs National Reconstruction Commission
2 Ministry Economic Affairs Marche Region Communication Center
3 Ministry Economic Affairs Regional Reconstruction Group
4 Groningen Province Assisi Municipality
5 Middle Groningen Municipality Norcia Municipality
6 Middle Groningen Municipality Local Community Preci
7 Groningen Safety Region Local Group Hospitality Displaced Citizens
8 Groningen Safety Region Local group I Love Nortica
9 National Coordinator Groningen Local group We are Norcia
10 National Coordinator Groningen Geology Camerino
11 Local Group Gasberaad Association of young farmers in Marche
12 Local Group Gasberaad Campi di Norcia
13 Local (Action) Group Groninger Bodum beweging Sviluppumbria Umbria
14 Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) University of Perugia Cultural and Communication Processes
15 Dutch Petroleum Company (NAM) Geology University of Perugia
16 Dutch Petroleum Company (NAM)
17 State Supervision of Mines
State Supervision of Mines
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